A new briefing from the Rights Practice in collaboration with FairSquare captures the outcomes of two workshops exploring the experiences of members of the UK’s diaspora and activist communities who are targets of transnational repression by autocratic states, and the law and policy responses to TNR.
The term transnational repression (TNR) is widely used within diaspora communities and among legislators and researchers to describe the range of techniques used by autocratic states to spread fear and silence critics located outside their borders. The threat to individuals and communities in the UK – including human rights defenders and activists – is real and reflects the immense unchecked power states enjoy in their own territory and their willingness to deploy such powers abroad.
A January 2024 Rights Practice and FairSquare workshop brought together participants from Arab states, Iran, Hong Kong, Tibetan and Uyghur communities, to discuss their experience and, as persons affected by transnational repression, what they wanted and needed from the UK government and civil society. All had direct experience of being targeted in the UK by persons they believed to be acting on behalf of their home country. They described a broad range of largely similar techniques that had been used against them including stalking, harassment and physical threats (in some cases death threats); coercion by proxy of family members in their home country; digital surveillance including phone hacking; financial sanctions such as confiscation of property and freezing assets; disinformation and online identity theft, as well as having legal cases being brought against them.
A key aim of transnational repression is to restrict negative coverage of the perpetrator country. Media suppression extends beyond borders with opposition media organisations being listed as terrorist organisations and lists of opposition journalists published on government websites. Autocratic states have made use of powerful spyware, such as hacking software Pegasus, to monitor the phones of targets including journalists and dissidents. Participants also described how fake social media accounts had been set up in the names of dissidents, spreading disinformation and undermining their reputation. Workshop participants noted state efforts to abuse administrative powers. For example, embassy responsibilities to issue passports and birth certificates are being used as leverage over dissidents, either trapping them or their families in-country or preventing them from returning. Belarus and Egypt were both criticised by attendees for this practice. Hong Kong’s National Security Law and Article 23 legislation gives new domestic security laws extraterritorial reach. Last year, the Hong Kong police issued arrest warrants and offered HK$ 1 million bounties leading to the arrest of overseas activists, including several in the UK.
For some participants, in exile for many years, transnational repression has become normalised. It was seen as the “price you pay” for their work as journalists or researchers and not a priority compared to the human rights violations they were trying to document in their home country.
Experience with UK Government and its agencies
Participants at the January workshop explained that many of those experiencing TNR were unsure who to approach. Some persons had contacts in FCDO or the Home Office and could share their concerns directly, but for most members of diaspora communities the police or a Member of Parliament were the only officials they thought to contact.
There was a general view among participants that police in Britain are unfamiliar with TNR and ill-equipped to deal with it. Participants mentioned that every time they reported an incident they had to provide detailed background on the country context, an exhausting task which acted as a disincentive to making reports. A lawyer who represented victims of TNR commented on the technological sophistication of attacks and lack of police understanding of the issues. A common police response was to recommend that the dissident stop what they were doing: “stop posting things online and you’ll stop being harassed.” Many victims complained that they were left in the dark about what steps were being taken by the police or other agencies.
Police are unwilling to carry out investigations in circumstances where no ‘crime’ has been committed (such as government agents approaching family members in their home country). Even when evidence of an offence is presented (such as phone hacking), the UK government seems to prefer using diplomatic channels, particularly with those states with which it had an important strategic relationship. Victims of hacking by Pegasus have had to pursue their own civil litigation through UK courts in cases which are currently ongoing.
There is a perception among some members of targeted communities that there is a tacit agreement between the UK government and certain Arab states with which the UK enjoys close strategic and economic relations that all forms of TNR are tolerated except physical violence.
There was a general sense among participants that the UK government needed to do better; that they need to acknowledge TNR and be open with those targeted about their response. Effective government communications, both private and public, would not only reassure victims, but also act as a preventive measure. Participants were concerned that a failure to demonstrate resolve would embolden perpetrators, with this already happening with regards to Iran which has felt able to carry out increasing acts of intimidation on UK soil.
Law and policy responses
The briefing summarises the findings and recommendations of the January workshop as well as that of a February workshop held by The Rights Practice with the Transnational Law institute at King’s College London which considered the law and policy responses to TNR being implemented in the UK.
Participants in the February workshop acknowledged the difficulties of shaping an effective policy response to transnational repression and human rights violations. A focus on repression may, some suggested, encourage punishing the perpetrators rather than protecting the victims.
In December 2023, the National Security Act came into force in the UK. Participants at the February workshop noted provisions regarding the new offence of foreign interference in the exercise of their human rights by a person in the UK.
There was some disquiet at the securitised approach of the National Security Act and the emphasis on protecting democracy in the UK rather than the human rights of individuals. The new law may unintentionally stifle rather than protect freedom of expression and association. There was also concern that the focus on law enforcement and criminalisation could restrict the ability of other arms of government to engage meaningfully with victims of TNR, for fear of jeopardising a potential criminal investigation. It is essential that the full range of concerned agencies can play their part in supporting victims in the vast majority of reported cases of TNR that are highly unlikely to meet the threshold for prosecution.
The government also recognised that policing was not the only possible response to foreign interference and repression of those in the UK. Diplomatic tools, including foreign policy, were also available. As participants in the January workshop observed, however, diplomatic tools generally lack transparency and do not give victims the reassurance and acknowledgement of harm that many want. There are also concerns that diplomatic tools are used inconsistently. States with close strategic partnerships with the UK seem to face fewer sanctions or public reprimands than other offending states.
Ways forward
Although participants recognised the limitations of a law-based response to transnational repression they also noted that the law can be helpful both in signalling government intent and in its instructional value in clarifying unacceptable acts. With criminal law likely to play a limited role in addressing transnational repression, the roles and responsibilities of state and non-state actors, including NGOs and universities, to protect survivors should be given a higher priority. A human rights-based approach could help to shape a holistic response in which the voices of those who have experienced TNR and target communities are heard: their support needs are considered, and their views consulted on who should be pursued for accountability.
Stronger communications by the UK government are also needed. Victims need to hear that the British government recognised the threats they faced and the impact this had on themselves and their families. The police should be expected to keep victims informed of any developments if they had reported an incident regardless of whether criminal charges were being pursued. Participants from targeted communities agreed that more could be done to make them aware of the legal and practical assistance that is available. Guidance in community languages could include information on digital security, advice on dealing with threats, collecting relevant evidence and understanding UK law and their rights.
